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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
As we expand debt in the process in want creation, we come necessarily to depend on this 
expansion. An interruption in the increase in debt means an actual reduction in the demands for 
goods. Debt, in turn can be expanded by measures which, in the nature of the case, cannot be 
indefinitely continued. (Galbraith, 1973 [1958], p. 170) 
 
With household assets rising as well, the ratio of net worth to income is currently somewhat higher 
than its long-run average. So long as financial intermediation continues to expand, both household 
debt and assets are likely to rise faster than income… Overall, the household sector seems to be in 
good shape, and much of the apparent increase in the household sector’s debt ratios over the past 
decade reflects factors that do not suggest increasing household financial stress. (Greenspan, 
2004) 
 
The concept of financialization within the social sciences is a relatively new area of academic 
inquiry that provides analytical tools to understand changes in the pattern of accumulation that 
exists within dynamic contemporary capitalisms (Engelen, 2008; Goldstein, 2009). As a concept, 
financialization does not purport to be totalizing concept that will hold for all places, spaces and 
times (Froud & Johal, 2008). The newness of “financialization” as a type of discourse and 
analytical tool means that as a term it does not yet have a common definition, however there 
have been identified clear tendencies that enable this conceptual tool to move between different 
political economic and heterodox analyses whilst maintaining explanatory purchase. 
Financialization can be broadly defined as the change in the generation of profits, within in an 
economy, which are increasingly made through financial means, and are not based on 
production1 (Krippner, 2005; Orhangazi, 2008b). Financialization can be thought of as a 
modified Marxian circuit of capital accumulation, where investment in production does not take 
place and instead becomes: [M] – [C] – [M’], where M is the initial money capital, C is the 
financial commodity and the markets in which it is used, and M’ is the new money capital 
accumulated from that initial money capital investment (Krippner, 2005; Marx, 1990a [1976]). 
Coupled with the generation of profits through increasingly financial means are the ways the 
economy and broader social institutions and practices support the existing structure of 
accumulation, to provide stability and predictability (Jessop, 1997). With literature that analyzes 
                                                            
1 Production is not understood narrowly, and includes the production of goods and services. 
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specifically how the changes in the generation of profits within the economy, in particular that of 
the United States of America (US), can be understood as financialization, this thesis instead 
focuses on US households, and how financialization can be used to understand changes that 
have occurred between 1950 and 2007 that have impacted on households’ accrual of debt. In this 
way Epstein’s (2005, 3) broad definition of financialization is helpful, ‘the increasing role of 
financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of 
the domestic and international economies’. Krippner (2005, pp. 174-175, 181-182) centering her 
research as financialization as a pattern of accumulation provides an ability to characterize 
financialization as multi-dimensional framework for understanding how, at macro and micro 
levels, economy functions, and in part this thesis will utilize that categorization for understanding 
how financialization impacts on US households. 
 
This thesis starts its analysis at 1950, the beginning of the post-war economic boom, until 2007, 
before the start of the global financial crisis, focusing on changes to US households, trends in 
households’ credit consumption, and understanding these changes through the lens of 
financialization. There have been changes in US households’ credit consumption, that are 
particularly acute from around the 1980s – the time that is broadly commensurate to when 
changes to the US economy can be categorized as the process of financialization (Crotty, 2005; 
Epstein & Jayadev, 2005; Krippner, 2005; Orhangazi, 2008a; Stockhammer, 2008). The thesis 
will explore how financialization has impacted households and their consumption of credit, and 
where possible their differentiated impacts based broadly on income quintiles and net worth 
percentiles, including the issues of employment, income, credit consumption, and what role the 
government has had in relation to supporting a financialized mode of existence for households. 
Further, with a focus on the increasing level of debt held on households’ balance sheets, there 
will be an analysis of the different types of household credit, identifying trends in relation to 
households’ debt holdings, and how these trends impact on different household groups. It 
should also be noted, that this thesis is not suggesting that financialization is a pattern of 
accumulation that has come into existence recently, but is instead locating what is happening 
within US households as part of the existing pattern of financialized accumulation that is 
occurring within the contemporary moment as a form of capitalism.  
 
For this thesis, US households are the site and unit of analysis. In households being the site and 
unit of analysis, this thesis recognizes that households are heterogeneous and have multiple 
characteristics that are not easily ascribed to each and every household, and that levels of wealth 
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and income are likely to have differential impacts, especially when examining financialization. 
The economic data collected by US Government agencies can give a broad picture of trends 
existent within households, especially as it relates to different income quintiles and wealth 
percentiles. To be clear, it is at no time assumed that each and every household behaves in 
exactly the same way, but there are some aspects of economic activity, especially in the 
identification of broad trends, that can be generally representative of the likely impacts on 
households. 
 
This thesis will use the Keynesian economic accounting framework, and social and economic 
data that is available publicly by various US Government departments. The use of this data is 
understood as an approximation, is not perfect in its collection, is not an exact replica or 
indication of what happens in each and every sector and institution in society as it relates to 
economic and social interactions (especially the household), and is a guide to understanding 
broad trends in US households. The use of US Government data sets is being utilized to be able 
to better identify broad trends that have and are happening within US households. The 
identification of these trends will add to the existing body of work that has analyzed the US 
macro-economy to understand how to identify and understand financial pattern of accumulation, 
and the broader social influences that enable this structure of accumulation to occur. Further in 
focusing on the household, the small pool of current literature that discusses the impact of 
financialization on US households is broadened to focus on the differential effect financialization 
has on different households, especially as it pertains to relative wealth and income levels, and the 
consumption of credit.  
 
The main mode of interrogation that this thesis utilizes is historical quantitative and qualitative 
comparative analyses, in particular the two periods of 1950-1979 and 1980-2007, recognizing that 
those dates are not rigid, and there is likely to be some cross over between the notional end and 
start dates of the 1970s and 1980s. In using the variety of US Government data sets, this thesis 
will identify when the data is aggregated and disaggregated and to what degree the disaggregation 
occurs. Further given the interrogation includes differential household analysis, where there are 
difficulties in using aggregated data especially to disaggregate, this thesis will endeavor where 
aggregated data is not easily disaggregated to find disaggregated analogues, and this thesis will 
note the instances where this occurs. 
 
Financial markets and systems are an important part of capitalist patterns of accumulation. It is 
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generally from the financial markets and institutions that the initial money used for investment 
purposes is originated, as illustrated in the Marxian circuit of accumulation (Marx, 1990b [1976]). 
With increasingly complex webs of relationships between the financial sectors and real sectors, 
there requires further analysis of households and their part in this web. It is for this reason that 
this thesis views the real and financial sectors as autonomous and interdependent at the same 
time.  
 
Chapter 2 starts from analyzing the financialization as phenomena and concept. The initial 
economic analysis points to the importance of households in the US economy, and points out 
the increasing levels of debt that households, aggregated, have taken on, and the declining levels 
of wages and salaries as a percentage of total personal income. It is through this economic 
analysis that the increasing importance of the financial services industry is surfaced, however its 
position seems to be a contradictory one. This chapter finishes with an assessment and analysis 
of the current literature on financialization, looking at the broad themes and theoretical 
underpinnings of the financialization corpus. 
 
Chapter 3 then explores identified trends in the US Flow of Funds Accounts in relation to 
aggregate levels of households’ indebtedness. Chapter 4 takes up the issue of what social and 
economic changes have taken place in households pre and post 1980s, at different income and 
wealth levels, as it pertains to salary and wages and the changing structure of the labor market, 
households incomes, and government policy. Chapter 5 examines how the evidence presented is 
part of financialization and its impacts on US households, utilizing the multi-dimensional 
framework described by Krippner’s (2005, pp. 174-175, 181-182) for understanding the 
operation of financialization within the economy.  
 
This thesis in developing the analysis of US households and their consumption of credit in this 
way, is extending the limits of financialization research to show that the concept of 
financialization has impacts and continues to impact on, and in particular, the middle and lower 
income and net wealth households in the US. It is also envisaged that in undertaking the analysis 
in this way that with financialization being applied to new empirical terrain that there is a partial 
reworking of the concept of financialization, and that this thesis provides another avenue 
through which to understand this phenomena as it applies to US households. Lastly, this thesis 
has explicitly eschewed developing macro-economic models and econometric tests, instead 
seeking to distil empirically stylized information, thereby contributing to understanding which 
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aspects of financialization are important as it relates to US households, and the US economy and 
society. 
 
As a side note, as most of the literature and all of the data being used in this thesis comes out of 
the United States of America, this thesis will be using the US system of English spelling.
Page 14 of 79 
 
Chapter 2 - Financialization as phenomena and concept – brief economic 
analysis and literature review 
 
The development of finance capital changes fundamentally the economic, and hence the political, 
structure of society (Hilferding, 2006 [1910], p. 337). 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Financialization, as an academic concept, and as a searchable key word in the social science 
discourses, specifically to political economy and heterodox economics, is relatively new (Engelen, 
2008, p. 112; Goldstein, 2009, p. 453). Finance is best understood as the provision of money. As 
a concept, financialization is generally understood as, ‘the increasing role of financial motives, 
financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and 
international economies’ (Epstein, 2005, p. 3). Epstein and Jayadev (2005), and Krippner (2003) 
characterizes this increased role of financial motives as a change in the pattern of accumulation, 
in the post-war economic period, especially as it relates to where in the broader economy profits 
are generated. Thus the concept of financialization functions to examine the increasing role of 
the provisioning of money in the social and economic spheres, focusing analysis on the attendant 
relationships between its allocation, actors, institutions and instruments, in the performance of 
the domestic and/or international economy. 
 
The financial system can be understood as the means to ‘channel the funds of savers in an 
economy to those who need funds to finance real economic activity’ (Shin, 2010, p. 96). Within 
orthodox economic approaches there are four models that can explain how the financial system 
operates, each with the household as an integral part of the system (Shin, 2010). Having an 
understanding of the orthodox economic models of financial systems is useful for understanding 
financialization and its attendant methodological processes and practices.  
 
Within orthodox economics, there are four financial systems, increasing in complexity, that 
explain the role of households in the financial market. First is that of ‘yeoman farmer economy’, 
where everyone is identical, and households and firms are the same identity (Shin, 2010, p. 96). 
Second is the simple financing relationship, where households directly finance firms (Shin, 2010, 
p. 97). The financial system organizes, through appropriate social and legal regulation, the 
transfer of funds from the household directly to the firm and for the firm issues debt on its 
assets/productive activities – a type of bond. Third is financial intermediation where a deposit-
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taking bank is also involved in acting as an intermediary between the firm and household2 (Shin, 
2010, p. 98). The firm can directly borrow from the deposit- taking bank, as well as issuing debt 
directly to households; households deposit their money into the deposit-taking bank and can also 
accept directly firms’ issues of bonds. Lastly is a securitization system of financial intermediation 
(Shin, 2010, pp. 99-102). This fourth system of finance includes other financial intermediaries’ 
involvement in the financial system, as well as deposit-taking banks, firms and households3. 
Securitization is the ‘practise of parceling and selling loans and other debt claims to other 
financial  institutions, who then hold those purchased claims and then issue liabilities backed by 
such claims’ (Shin, 2010, p. 99). Financial intermediaries and deposit-taking banks can also be 
borrowers and lenders to each other. In this way the securitized system of financial 
intermediation creates increasingly complex financial relationships that become more dependent 
on the conditions of capital market conditions (Shin, 2010, p. 102). It is this increasingly complex 
web of financial systems that financialization, in analyzing both economic and social conditions, 
takes up in its examination, arguing that what occurs in financial systems is not divorced from 
the social environment. 
 
Two issues arise from the orthodox models outlines. There is a reliance on households, in 
aggregate, being a net saver in an economy (Shin, 2010, p. 102). Orthodox economics see finance 
and the financial markets operating to invest in real economic activity (Shin, 2010, p. 96). This 
thesis argues that under a financialized pattern of accumulation, the reliance on households as 
net savers in the economy reduces and is not a reflection of what is happening due to a variety of 
factors (Eatwell & Taylor, 2001, pp. 121-126); these will be explored later in the thesis. In 
relation to the financial system operating to invest in the real economy, this thesis views the 
operation of the financial system as not, whether this is possible or not, differentiating between 
real and financial economic investment (Eatwell & Taylor, 2001, pp. 96-135). 
 
In order to situate the thesis within the discourse of financialization, and illustrate the attendant 
phenomena, this thesis will first present selected data to demonstrate the increasing influence of 
finance in the US and US households, utilizing economic data. Secondly provide an analysis of 
the extant corpus on the concept financialization, through an exploration of the broad subjects 
                                                            
2 This can also be described as the savings and loan model of banking, as it involves depositary institutions receiving 
money from depositors to be able to be loaned to others. This form of banking does not involve other financial 
intermediaries. 
3 This can also be described as the financial model of banking, as it involves financial instruments, markets and 
processes, and financial institutions. 
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of analysis undertaken in the literature, and identify the main theoretical paradigms utilizing this 
concept.   
 
2.2 Financialization as Phenomena – brief economic analysis 
Financialization, taking a broad understanding, includes changes within the financial system as 
well as changes to the relationship between the financial and real sectors of the economy 
(Epstein, 2005, p. 3). Thus, there is likely to be changes at the macro and household levels of the 
economy that may be perceived through economic data collected by US public sector 
departments. The analysis of the households in the US through the lens of financialization begins 
with first exploring changes in gross economic data of the US economy. Analyses undertaken by 
Dumenil and Levy (2005), Epstein and Jayadev (2005), Krippner (2003, 2005) illustrate the rise 
of rentier incomes, those incomes derived from profits from financial market activity of the 
financial industry, in the macro-economy from around the 1980s onwards, and the changing 
structure and pattern of accumulation. Rather than restate that terrain of academic work, this 
section on the phenomena of financialization focuses on gross domestic product (GDP), 
household and personal incomes, and employment. It should be noted that the use of GDP is as 
a hybrid measure, rmeasuring activity (output) and accumulation (profit component of national 
income) (Krippner, 2005, p. 180). 
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Figure 1: Components of GDP as a % of total nominal GDP 1950-2007 
 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (table 1.1.5) 
 
Utilizing the final demand/expenditure approach to measuring gross domestic product4, figure 1 
illustrates the proportional shares of nominal GDP (Landefeld, Seskin, & Fraumeni, 2008). Of 
particular note is the rising proportion of nominal GDP made up of private consumption from 
the period of the 1980s onwards. The method of calculation for the consumption component5 of 
final demand calculated GDP is taken from data that estimates final goods and services to 
consumers that excludes sales to other businesses (Landefeld, Seskin, & Fraumeni, 2008, pp. 
197-199). It can be reasonably assumed, from expenditure measured GDP, that the majority of 
consumption is undertaken by and/or made for US households. Therefore, as consumption of 
final demand GDP is the largest component in the US, households are major actors in the US 
economy.  
 
                                                            
4 Where the aggregate expenditure GDP consists of private consumption (C), investment (I), government 
expenditures (G), and net exports (X-M) 
5 Consumption using the final demand approach to GDP starts with the addition of: total sales by producers of final 
goods and services, transportation costs, wholesale and retail trade margins, sales tax and imports. Deducted from 
this interim amount are: changes in inventories, exports, sales to business and sales to government. 
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Analyzing figure 1 further, illustrates that there has been a change in consumption by 
households, when examining the time period from 1950 to 2007. Average private consumption 
from 1950 to 1979 was 62.3 % of nominal final demand GDP. As depicted in figure 1, the 
period from 1950 - 1979 had relatively stable private consumption. From 1980 to 1989 average 
private consumption rises to 64.3% of nominal GDP; in the next decade 1990 to 1999 this rises 
again to 67%. In the final decade of analysis, 2000 – 2007, average percentage of private 
consumption as a percentage of nominal expenditure calculated GDP rises to approximately 
70%. Comparing the two periods, 1950 – 1979 and 1980 – 2007, there has been an increase in 
private consumption in the latter period, from the relatively stable former period. Further, this 
change occurring around the late 1970s/ early 1980s suggests further analysis is required to 
ascertain changes, in particular to the household. 
 
Figure 2: Contribution to percent change of real GDP from 1950-2007 
 
Source: BEA (table 1.1.2) 
 
In examining figure 2, the data illustrates the major role consumption has in contributing to US 
real GDP growth, with some minor exceptions. Consumption generally makes up more than half 
of GDP growth in the time period shown, and appears to be the main driver of real GDP 
growth in the US, especially from about the 1980s onwards. Figure 2, viewed in conjunction with 
figure 1, also demonstrates and strengthens the importance of households in the US economy, 
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given the reasonable supposition of private consumption being largely undertaken by 
households.  
 
To explore the changes in consumption, as it pertains to the household, an examination of US 
households’ savings and debt levels could, all things being equal, partially explain figure 1. 
Changes that could affect consumption in households are households’ levels of savings and/or 
indebtedness. A decline in savings and/or a rise in debt could be correlated to a rise in 
consumption.  
 
Figure 3: Aggregated US Households Savings and Debt 1950-2007 
 
Source: BEA (table2.1) & Federal Reserve Bank (FRB) Flow of Funds Accounts (FFA) (tables L1 & F100) 
 
Figure 3 depicts, on aggregate, the level of savings and indebtedness of US households. 
Indebtedness was measured, on aggregate, using total household debt as a proportion of total 
disposable income6. Savings was measured, on aggregate, using total household savings as a 
                                                            
6 That is after tax household income from all sources including wages/salary, interest, etc. 
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percentage of disposable income. Figure 3 demonstrates, using aggregated household data, that 
levels of indebtedness have risen, after a relatively stable period from the 1960s to early 1980s. 
Further, savings as a percentage of disposable income has also declined from the early 1980s, 
despite the period of 1950 – to late 1970s of growing savings on average. The declining savings 
and rising indebtedness by US households occurs within the similar period as the rise in private 
consumption that occurs in the late 1970s/early 1980s, as shown by figure 1. The change in 
consumption by US households, taken in aggregate and measured by final demand nominal 
GDP, is correlated to changes in the savings and debt holdings. Utilizing Epstein’s (2005:3) 
definition of financialization, the changing savings and debt levels of US households illustrated in 
figure 3 suggests that there is financial elements to this change. As an aggregate holder of debt, 
households are financial actors and interact with financial markets and institutions, as the 
markets provide and the institutions allocate money available to be loaned. Further, US 
households by interacting with financial institutions that allocate and provide finance, are also 
interacting, albeit indirectly, with financial institutions that regulate financial markets.  
 
Utilizing the production approach7 to measuring GDP this would provide an initial overview of 
value-added production by different industries in calculating GDP and provide an understanding 
for the characterization of where profits are generated in the economy (Landefeld, Seskin, & 
Fraumeni, 2008, pp. 211-212), paying specific attention to the the finance, insurance, and real 
estate (FIRE) industry.  
 
                                                            
7 The production approach to measure GDP is the summation of output (gross sales less changes inventories) by 
industry, less intermediate inputs. 
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Figure 4: Selected industry shares as a % of nominal GDP (value-added approach) 
 
Source: BEA Annual Industry Accounts (AIA) 
 
Figure 4 depicts the largest three industries, whose value-added production individually has been 
over 10% of production measured GDP from 1950-2007; the three industries being FIRE, 
government, and the manufacturing industries. These three industries, together, also make up 
between 46 to 54% of value–added production measured GDP for the time period analyzed. 
From about the 1980s onward the FIRE industry has increased its overall value-added share of 
nominal GDP by more than 5%, and has become the largest contributor to production 
measured GDP from the mid 1980s. Manufacturing over the 60 year period has decreased its 
share of value-added production, with the decline occurring in the early 1970s. Government, on 
the other hand, has remained relatively stable, remaining within the 10-15% band of value-added 
production to GDP over the same period. In same time periods discussed, the share of these 
three industries value-added GDP, when summed together, has also decreased since the early 
1970s to 2007 by 8%. When looking at the decline of the manufacturing industry on GDP, 
measured by value-added production, the possibility of the changing pattern of accumulation, 
from production to finance, needs to be considered. 
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With the changes in two out of the three major industries contributing to value-added GDP 
growth, there are likely to be impacts on the share of total employment in the FIRE and 
manufacturing industries. Households have limited avenues in which to generate household 
income, with employment and the accrual of salary and wages, being the major component (see 
figure 8). Thus an analysis of employment is necessary to be undertaken in order to examine the 
impact of financialization on households and their credit consumption. There is also the 
possibility the composition of aggregate personal income could change, as the demands for 
labor, capital, finance and land, and the subsequent payments of wages, profit, interest and rent, 
are different for the FIRE and manufacturing industries. However applying neoclassical marginal 
productivity theory8 at a macroeconomic level, given the demand for goods and services 
provided by the FIRE industry have risen, there should be an increase in the employment in that 
industry, all things being equal, as the demand for labor is derived from the value of the goods 
and services it produces (Pasinetti, 1977, pp. 24-32). A similar assumption can be made about the 
manufacturing industry as well. Thus there should not be a major change in the makeup of 
aggregate personal income. Figures 5 and 8, illustrate, from 1950-2007, the percentage of total 
employment of the FIRE, government and manufacturing industries, and the composition of 
aggregate personal income. 
 
                                                            
8 Marginal productivity theory assumes that each factor of production (labor, capital, land) would receive a return 
(wages, profit and rent) equal to its contribution to the production process, i.e. the value of its marginal product.  
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Figure 5: % total employment of FIRE, Government & Manufacturing industries 
 
Source: BEA AIA 
 
Figure 5, when viewed with figure 4, shows that in the case of manufacturing and government 
industries that there is a correlation between share of value-added GDP growth and percentage 
composition of the labor market. This is in contrast to the FIRE industry where the proportion 
of employment has not grown in line with the increasing share that this industry has in the 
measurement of value-added production GDP, according to marginal productivity theory. With 
the decline in employment in the manufacturing industry, and no increase in the level of 
employment in the FIRE industry, it follows, all things being equal, that the share of 
employment growth has occurred in other industries. This is not to suggest that employment 
skills are easily transferrable, completely substitutable, and valued similarly between industries, as 
this is not the case ( (Doeringer & Piore, 1971; Peck, 1996). Figure 6 illustrates the industries that 
have a rising proportion of employment from 1950 to 2007, excluding the FIRE industry from 
this data. The industries that have have had employment growth in proportion to other 
industries, are the arts, entertainment, recreation, accomodation and food services (AERAF), 
education, health care and social assistance services (EHSA), professional and business services 
(PB) and retail trade industries (RT).  
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Figure 6: Industries with rising proportions of employment 1950-2007 
 
Source: BEA AIA 
 
Figure 7 draws on similar data to figure 4, illustrating the proportion of value-added GDP of the 
AERAF, EHSA, PB and RT industries contribute to overall production. Comparing the data in 
figure 6, with the graph in figure 7, initially there is no correlation between the proportion of 
total employment and value-added GDP, although there is a weak correlation in the PB industry. 
Further, in the case of the AERAF, EHSA and RT industries, there is a widening gap between 
proportion of employment and value-added GDP, where share of the labor market is greater 
than production. Applying marginal productivity theory to this issue proposes, that all things 
being equal, that the lower the wage, the more labor that will be demanded by an industry9 
(Pasinetti, 1977, pp. 24-32). Thus it is possible, that the AERAF, EHSA and RT industries have 
low wages and conditions of employment, and this has contributed to their rising share of 
employment. 
 
                                                            
9 This proposition of marginal productivity theory is not dependent on labour equalling its marginal product. 
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Figure 7: Proportion of value-added GDP of the AERAF, EHSA, PB & RT industries 
 
Source: BEA AIA 
 
The changes in the composition of the labor market, and the production measured GDP by 
industry is likely to have an impact on households’ incomes and impact on households 
differentially. Peck (1996, 6-13, 119-152) theorises of a core and periphery in labor markets. The 
periphery is associated with the education and training, welfare, and industries where there is low 
pay, generally low unionisation rates, and high casualisation and turnover; compared to the core 
where there are better wages and conditions of employment and lower turnover (Peck, 1996, pp. 
6-13, 119-152). The rising proportions of employment in the AERAF, EHSA, and RT industries, 
using Peck’s (1996, 6-13) classification system, would indicate that there has been a relative 
growth in the periphery labor market. Thus the changing composition of the labor market is 
likely to impact on the aggregate composition of personal income. 
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Figure 8: Composition of Aggregate Personal Income 
 
Source: BEA (table 2.1) 
 
Figure 8 illustrates that, in aggregate, the composition of personal income is largely made up of 
payments to employees, through the payments of salary and wages, and supplements10. However 
the proportion of personal income that comes from payments to employees is falling. There is 
also an increase in personal current transfers, which includes government benefits and transfers 
from businesses. Given that there is an increasing level of debt held by households, when 
aggregated, as per figure 3, and a labor market that is, proportionally, becoming composed of 
employment on the periphery, there is a need for further examination of disaggregated 
household data, and how, at least in the aggregate, with falling proportion of income from salary 
and wages, household debt can rise. 
 
The initial macroeconomic and household analysis undertaken above demonstrates the need for 
further examination of the trends identified above in figures 1-8, especially when there is the 
transition to a finance pattern of accumulation from about the 1980s onward; that being the 
change in and importance of consumption of demand measured GDP and real GDP growth, 
increasing aggregate household debt and decline in savings, the FIRE industry overtaking 
manufacturing as the largest industry contributor to value-added production in the last 20 years, 
the changing structure of the labor market, and the changes in composition in households’ 
incomes, with the attendant impact on household debt. The occurrences of these economic 
                                                            
10 Supplements include employer contributions to employee pension and insurance funds, and employer 
contributions for government social insurance 
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trends take place from around the 1980s. From this initial analysis of economic data of the US 
macro-economy, focusing on different calculations of GDP, analysis of the proportion of 
industry employment and breakdown of value-added GDP, composition of personal income and 
the level of savings and debt, in aggregate, of US households there is a change the structuring of 
the economy that occurs from about the 1980s onward. The change in the US macro-economy 
and households is identified from approximately the 1980s onwards and could be linked to 
changes in the way capital accumulation occurs. This possible change in the pattern of 
accumulation, with the data presented, is correlated to the increased in value-added production 
as measured by GDP of the FIRE industry. As households are major actors in the US economy, 
with increasing levels of aggregated household debt, further analysis is required to comprehend 
the factors that correlate a possible change in the structure of capital accumulation in the US 
economy, and rising levels of households’ consumption of credit. It is for these reasons that this 
thesis will focus its analysis on US households and households’ debt. 
  
2.3 Financialization as concept – literature review 
The importance of the FIRE industry in production measured GDP, and, aggregated households 
rising level of indebtedness suggests that financialization provides a useful conceptual approach 
to further analyze US households and households’ debt. 
 
Financialization as a concept used in academic discourse, has been utilized by different 
theoretical approaches (Engelen, 2008; Froud & Johal, 2008; Goldstein, 2009). Within a field of 
inquiry, in this case political economy, theory provides a paradigm that frames the technical, and 
theoretical approaches to the pursuit of knowledge.In this way theories, and their multiple 
approaches, are understood as abstractions and simplifications of reality and serves to make 
reality intelligible, understandable and able to be theorized. Theories, also does not act as a 
substitute for reality but provides guidance for understanding, and knowledge dissemination and 
creation. However, theory is developed within geographical, historical, spatial and temporal 
contexts and may not hold for all times, places and spaces (Schuster, 1995-2005, pp. 116-140). In 
the case of political economic approaches, consensus and coherence around one theoretical 
explanation does not hold, though shared concepts, subjects and objects of analysis can be 
identified (Engelen, 2008; Epstein, 2005; Goldstein, 2009; Schuster, 1995-2005). This 
disagreement about differing theoretical approaches within political economy is magnified as the 
general field of study, broadly speaking the social, institutional and economic, are complex and 
dynamic. However a concept, in this case financialization, is able to provide another tool within 
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the broad theoretical approaches that exist within political economy that can cohere and provide 
a limited consensus of economic, political and/or social phenomena (Engelen, 2008; Epstein, 
2005; Goldstein, 2009). Financialization does not purport to be a global totalizing concept, 
instead providing for the unevenness of its development, and scope for diverse theoretical 
analyses (Froud & Johal, 2008). Thus financialization operates within a plurality of theories that 
presents the conflicting and contradictory processes, theories, and actions that illustrate the 
heterogeneity of the social, political and economic spheres. In this way the term and concept 
known as financialization can further make intelligible political economic theories, and provide a 
way to broaden current theories and ways of understanding, and reworking extant theoretical 
approaches to have stronger explanatory power and currency (Engelen, 2008).  
 
Within the extant literature, there are two ways in which to understand that conceptual threads 
of financialization – based on theoretical approach, or by broad theme. For ease of identifying 
the purpose of this thesis, an exploration of the literature will occur by subjects of analysis, and 
the broad theoretical paradigms will be identified. The grouping of the financialization corpus 
into broad subjects does not suggest that the groupings are rigid and/or there exists one 
particular analytical subject. Instead the grouping of the financialization discourse serves to 
illustrate where this thesis fits within the broader, and how this thesis adds to the corpus of 
knowledge within the discipline of political economy.   
 
In using Epstein’s (2005: 3) broad characterization of financialization, for now, the literature 
review will be analyzed through the frame of changes in political, social and economic 
relationships between the debt of households in the United States and the financial realm, where 
the financial realm includes financial institutions, financial markets, instruments and processes, 
and federal government institutions involved in finance. After reviewing the extant literature on 
the concept of financialization, a narrower and specific analytical lens to the thesis topic, which is 
the credit consumption of US households, will become apparent.  
 
2.3.1 Themes in the extant financialization literature 
The extant financialization literature can be grouped by broad themes, which can be condensed 
into three topic areas: historical critiques of the rentier and financier, incorporating the concept 
of financialization into extant theoretical approaches, and the role of finance/ financial markets 
in shaping society and economy, and social, political and/or economic institutions. 
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The historical critiques of the rentier and financier can also be broken down into 2 sub-
categories, that of reformist approaches (Berle & Means, 1968 [1933]; Keynes, 1953; Tawney, 
1921) and radical/ Marxist approaches (Hilferding, 2006 [1910]; Bukharin, 1927). The historical 
critiques of the rentier and financier illustrate that evaluations of financialized capitalisms existed 
before the term “financialization” became incorporated within contemporary study of political 
economy.  
 
The reformist evaluations accepted the, ownership of private property, profit motive as 
motivator for entrepreneurial activity, and the necessity of wage labor (Berle & Means, 1968 
[1933], pp. 1-10, 18-46, 289-299, 340-352; Keynes, 1953, pp. 23-35, 210-221; Tawney, 1921, pp. 
8-32). However, the reformists argued for reforms to the capitalist economy so as regulate stable 
capital, product and labor markets, and increase social security as a result (Berle & Means, 1968 
[1933], pp. 340-344; Keynes, 1953, pp. 135-145, 280-290, 313-331; Tawney, 1921, pp. 33-84). In 
this way, Berle and Means (1968 [1933], 352-357), Keynes (1953, 372-383), and Tawney (1921, 
84-91) sought ways to limit the claims of persons who invested in shares in companies, as this in 
part was profiting from the passive use of capital/property.  
 
Hilferding (2006 [1910], 301-310) and Bukharin (1927, 15-34), on the other hand, had a negative 
opinion of the system of capitalism in particular the rise in importance of finance within 
capitalism and the circuit of accumulation. Utilizing Marxian concepts, that of class relations and 
the importance of production, they sought to theorize the changing class, and industrial 
structures and institutions taking place (Bukharin, 1927, pp. 109-127; Hilferding, 2006 [1910], pp. 
301-310, 337-350). In this way Hilferding (2006 [1910], 223-226,  and Bukharin (1927, 15-34) 
theorize a structural change in capitalist economic development, that of the eventual 
transformation of industrial capital and finance capital into cartels which have interdependent 
relationships with each other, and the rise of a class of households whose source of income is 
from financial means, respectively. Hilferding (2006 [1910], 337-350) also provides a brief 
analysis of the affect of this cartelization on labor and capital – conceptually stretching Marx’s 
original two class structure to allow the existence of multiple intra-class positions with the 
Marxian binary of labor and capital. The focus of Bukharin’s (1927) and Hilferding’s (2006 
[1910]) analysis is focused upon the rise of finance as a phase of capitalism and finance can be 
accommodated within the capitalist analysis that exists in Marx’s Capital. 
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In terms of households within the historical critiques, there is an aspect of the analysis that 
focuses on the class/stratum in society that profit from finance and financial means (Berle & 
Means, 1968 [1933]; Bukharin, 1927; Hilferding, 2006 [1910]; Keynes, 1953; Tawney, 1921). 
There is not so much an exploration on the differential impacts of finance on different classes 
and stratums that exist within society. The reformist critiques refer to increasing social security, 
and the radical critiques refer to labor. The mention of social security and labor can be 
understood as pointing out the differential impacts of finance on different households, 
particularly those that rely on salaries and wages, within society. However, these historical 
critiques of finance in the capitalist economies provide an empirical analysis, from their reformist 
and radical paradigms, of how finance is operating within the economy and society, and the 
deleterious impacts of letting finance go unchallenged. 
 
The second grouping of extant literature is the incorporation of financialization within existing 
theoretical paradigms. In each case, the theories are stretched to incorporate, ‘the increasing role 
of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the operation 
of the domestic and international economies’ ( (Epstein, 2005, p. 3). The literature that falls 
within this category can also be divided into Marxist, and Post-Keynesian approaches.  
 
Within the Marxist approaches, there is a re-conceptualizing of class to take into account how 
finance re-constitutes and re-defines notions of class as an economic construct, and as form of 
relation (Martin, Rafferty, & Bryan, Financialization, Risk and Labor, 2008; Bryan, Martin, & 
Rafferty, 2009), historical analysis of changes to the international financial system as a way to 
appraise Marx’s theory of money (Vasudevan, 2009), and the eventual stage of capitalism being 
dominated by the fluidities of financial capital (Mandel, 1983 [1975]). The Post-Keynesian modes 
of incorporating issues of finance into a Keynesian analysis, do so through an examination of the 
emergence of financial instability of the post 1950s era resulting from the volatility of 
investments (Minsky, 2008 [1986]), and the changes in the business cycle, institutions, and 
macroeconomic analysis that arises from including an assumption that not all financial 
investment results in macro-economic growth (Hein, 2009; Palley, Financialization: what it is and 
why it matters, 2007).  
 
The household does not appear within Vasudevan’s (2009) examination of Marx’s theory of 
money or Mandel’s investigation of the ascendency of finance in determining the character of 
capital accumulation. There is a very brief appearance of the household in Minsky’s (2008 
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[1986]34-35, 35-37, 38, 90, 140) work, but is not the main object of analysis the focus – which is 
on instability in the economy and the role finance plays in economic crises. The adaptation 
financialization into a re-conceptualization of Marxian class and class relations implies the 
household in its discussion; however the main role of these texts are to provide an initial 
framework for understanding Marxian class concepts within financialization. In this way, the 
objects of these studies is not specifically on households and the impact of financialization has 
on credit consumption. 
 
The last grouping of literature is the role that finance takes in shaping the economy, and social, 
political and/or economic institutions (broadly understood). This grouping can also be broken 
down into four groups: the increasing profit share of non-financial firms through financial 
channels (Orhangazi, 2008a; Orhangazi, 2008b); analytic approaches to understanding and 
quantifying financialization within specific contexts (Epstein & Jayadev, 2005; Krippner, 2003; 
Krippner, 2005; Magdoff & Sweezy, 1987a; Magdoff & Sweezy, 1987b, Onaran, Stockhammer 
and Grafl 2010, Stockhammer 2008, Stockhammer 2009); financial innovations and their impacts 
on institutions and markets (Aalbers, 2008; Aglietta, 2008; Crotty, 2008; Crotty, 2005; Dodd, 
2005; Langley, 2008); and, understanding financialization as everyday phenomena that affects 
and effects narratives and performance (Allon, 2009; Erturk, Froud, Johal, Leaver, & Williams, 
2007; Langley, 2007; Martin, 2002; Pixley, 2004). 
 
Focusing on these literature that specifically includes analysis on US households, there are 
analyses that look specifically at different types of household debt and its increase (Aalbers, 2008; 
Langley, 2008), changes in macro-economic income distribution (Onaran, Stockhammer, & 
Grafl, 2010), and the subjectivities and evolving agency of the household and individuals in a 
finance pattern of accumulation (Erturk, Froud, Johal, Leaver, & Williams, 2007; Langley, 2007; 
Martin, 2002). Within the listed literature, the household is treated as an homogenous entity. 
Further, the household has not had critical study into its situation within a finance pattern of 
accumulation, at a disaggregated level. 
 
Given that the thematic analysis of the extant literature illustrates that the household has been 
generally treated as a singular rather than a heterogeneous plurality, to fill the gaps depicting the 
different impacts of financialization on US households in relation to debt, is an important part 
that is missing from this current literature on financialization. This thesis, by identifying this gap 
Page 32 of 79 
 
within the discourse, will provide a prolegomena into US households and their consumption of 
credit that arises from the financialized pattern of accumulation within contemporary US 
capitalism. 
 
2.3.2 Theoretical Approaches to Financialization 
For the most part, the financialization literature surveyed for this thesis can be broadly grouped 
under four theoretical headings: Marxist, Post-Keynesian, Regulation, and cultural economic 
approaches. There was also literature that crossed theoretical boundaries and utilized approaches 
from two or more theoretical backgrounds. This section will first, briefly describe the main four 
theoretical approaches, and secondly identify what characteristics allow the concept of 
financialization to be utilized by these four theoretical lenses. 
 
There are four main approaches identified in the extant literature on financialization, that of 
Marxist, Post-Keynesian, Regulation and cultural economy. Marxist paradigms within finance 
and financialization, at their core, can be identified as analyzing the changes in capitalist 
production11, with these changes in production reproducing stratified class and social relations 
that translate into the form/s of social existence and manifest in the economy (Marx, 1934; 
Marx, 1973 [1939]; Marx & Engels, 1967 [1888]). The analyses also utilize Marxian categories of, 
the circuit of capital accumulation and its impacts on labor and capital (Marx, 1990a [1976]), 
stages and varieties of capitalism (Marx, 1991 [1981]; Marx, 1990b [1976]; Marx, 1990c [1976]), 
and the emergence of world money (Marx, 1904 [1897]).  
 
Post-Keynesian approaches within financialization discourse build on from Keynes’ (1958, 23-
34, 280-291) work on the importance of affective demand in the macro-economy, and 
structurally persistent unemployment, whilst rejecting attempts to construct Keynes’ theory 
within the mainstream economic logics and frameworks (Dow, 1996, pp. 76-81). In particular, 
the post-Keynesian approaches focus on production and distribution, and the causes and 
consequences of structural change and do so through an analysis of historical time, problems 
with existing knowledge and data, and institutions in the economy (Dow, 1996, pp. 76-81). The 
current financialization corpus that can be identified as Post-Keynesian also include analyses on 
economic fluctuations and that they are not necessarily self-correcting (Keynes, 1953, pp. 313-
332), role of government in regulating and maintaining aggregate demand (Keynes, 1953, pp. 
372-283), and the role of expectations (short and long term) in the economy as it links individual, 
                                                            
11 Which also includes distribution, exchange, and consumption 
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organizational and systemic behavior to understand the conditions of economic decision-making 
(Keynes, 1953, pp. 147-164).  
 
Regulation approaches, 
‘analyze the interconnections between the institutional forms and regularities of 
capitalist economies. It aims to study the changing combinations of economic and 
extra-economic institutions and practices which help secure, if only temporarily and 
always in specific economic spaces, a certain stability and predictability in 
accumulation - despite fundamental contradictions and conflicts generated by the 
very dynamic of capital itself.’ (Jessop, 1997, p. 288) 
Thus there is a deliberation on financialization as a pattern and/or structure of capitalist 
accumulation, and possible contradictions and conflicts that can and might occur within this 
capitalist accumulation regime. 
 
Lastly, cultural economic paradigms take as an initial proposition that the economy is understood 
by and formatted through discourse, which impacts on human subjects in the economy (Erturk, 
Froud, Johal, Leaver, & Williams, 2008, pp. 239-246). Human subjects in the economy both use 
and are used by discourse/s, and this is done to understand and navigate their subject positions 
as understood individually or by formal and informal social institutions (Erturk, Froud, Johal, 
Leaver, & Williams, 2008, pp. 239-246). In the case of financialization, cultural economy 
approaches analyze how the discourse of risk and new calculative technologies act upon and 
constitute different subject positions. 
 
From the brief analysis of the major theoretical strands in utilizing the concept of 
financialization, the theories share the following basic propositions: 
i. The capitalist economy is better understood as an historical, temporal, and/or dynamic 
process; 
ii. Economic and political institutions play a role in shaping the economy, but are not the sole 
institutions that can affect and effect the economy; and, 
iii. The economy is socially defined, whether in whole or part. 
There is a fourth proposition that applies mostly to Post-Keynesians, and in part Regulation and 
cultural economic approaches: in a world where uncertainty is unavoidable, expectations (held by 
formal and informal institutions, and individuals) can have an unavoidable and significant effect 
and affect on economic outcomes. 
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Given the newness of the concept and field of financialization, rather than adopt a particular 
theoretical paradigm under which to present this an analysis of households and their credit 
consumption in the US, this thesis will instead utilize the four propositions outlined above as the 
economic framework for analyzing financialization as it applies in particular to the US 
households and its rising levels of indebtedness. This enables flexibility in the analysis of the US 
household and its level of indebtedness, without rigidly having to apply theoretical paradigms in 
totality and allows the utilization of a mix of methodologies and theoretical underpinnings to be 
used. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
From the analysis undertaken above, this thesis understands that financialization is a pattern of 
accumulation that currently exists within the United States of America capitalist economy. 
Households are actors in the economy and form an important role, as institutions, in aggregate, 
that affect and effect the economy and society. The economic processes of financialization, 
especially that of risk and its calculation, do not exist absent of broader society, and the resulting 
calculation by formal and informal institutions, and groups within those formal and informal 
institutions can affect and effect the economy and society. How households deal with risk/s and 
its calculation can have unavoidable and significant effect and affect on economic outcomes. The 
quantitative analysis illustrate that households, in aggregate, are an important part of the US 
economy, yet households are as a small component of the current analysis on financialization 
within the field of political economy. Further, there is a gap within the financialization discourse 
in relation to a broader examination of US households disaggregated, and how the changes in the 
financial pattern of accumulation have differentially impacted on households’ levels of 
indebtedness. Thus, this thesis, in drawing on Epstein’s (2005, 3) definition, and Krippner’s 
(2005, pp. 174-175, 181-182) multi-dimensional characterization of understanding 
financialization, seeks to fill the gap within the current corpus on financialization by applying the 
definition and schema to the US household and levels of indebtedness, by disaggregating, where 
possibly, the data to illustrate the differential impacts on households.  
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Chapter 3: Trends in Household Credit: comparisons between pre and post 
1980 
 
…[T]he use value of the home remains necessarily localized, but the flows of money required to 
finance [it] have created a complex of web of payments to various individuals and institutions 
operating at various scales (Wyly, Hammel, & Atia, 2004 (March), p. 1). 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents selected US Flow of Funds Accounts (FFA) aggregated data on 
households’ credit consumption, from 1950 to 2007, that links the changes in accumulation 
regime, that of financialization, and how this interplay of finance has impacted on households 
and their access to and consumption of credit. The reasoning behind utilizing FFA data is that 
the FFA ‘measure financial flows across sectors of the economy, tracking funds as they move…’ 
throughout the economy, and ‘is useful for interpreting current economic data’ especially in 
eliucidating financial trends (Teplin, 2001, p. 431) In identifying the year 1980 as the rupture in 
which to identify broad trends, this thesis recognizes that this is not a rigid date that suggests 
changes only happened from this point onwards. Given the dynamism of the US capitalist 
economy, changes in accumulation regimes have their roots in the previous regime, thus there is 
likely to some cross over in terms of years. To this end, this chapter will firstly examine the 
changes in aggregate of households’ consumption of credit and secondly examine aggregate 
household credit trends, comparing pre and post 1980 data. 
 
3.2 Changes in households’ consumption of credit 
In order to situate this chapter within the thesis, this chapter will start by examining the 
aggregate changes in households’ consumption of credit, specifically paying attention to 
aggregate credit and liabilities, and the breakdown of this into its two major components, 
mortgage and consumer credit. Consumer credit can be broken down further into non-
revolving and revolving credit. Non-revolving credit are lines of credit provided by 
financial institutions that have a set credit amount and a specific end date for repayment. 
Non-revolving credit can be considered loans used to purchase cars and similar major 
expenditure. Revolving credit broadly defined are ongoing lines of credit provided by 
financial institutions that do not have a specific end date for when the funds borrowed are 
required to be paid back. The amount of revolving credit can be specified up to a certain 
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amount, or unlimited, according to the terms of the revolving credit agreement. Revolving 
credit data collected by the Federal Reserve (the Fed) is also viewed as a de facto measure 
of credit card debt (Furletti & Ody, 2006). 
 
It needs to be noted that the data used in this section and subsequent graphs utilizing FFA 
data, that in examining the FFA data as it pertains to households, non-profit institutions 
serving households (NPISH) are also included in that data. However in order to ensure 
that, in this case, aggregated households remain the site of analysis, in the breakdown of 
the data, data that is specifically and largely NPISH will not be incorporated in this 
analysis. 
Figure 9: Total Liabilities for households 1950-2007, inflation adjusted, measured in millions of 
$US 
 
Source: The Fed FFA Table Z1 & L100, BLS CPI 
 
Figure 9 shows the total liabilities for households over the period 1950-2007, adjusted for 
inflation. As can be seen, the period from 1950 to 1979 shows an increase in the inflation 
adjusted money volume liabilities for households, and the same can be seen for the period 
1980 to 2007. However the difference between these two periods of the inflation adjusted 
money volume of liabilities held by households is the rapid increase in the latter period. In 
order to understand the factors behind this rapid increase in aggregate of households’ 
consumption of credit from around the 1980s onward, this section now turns to the 
breakdown of households’ credit in terms of mortgage and consumer credit. 
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Figure 10: Total mortgage liabilities for households, aggregated, and adjusted for inflation 
(100=82-84) 
 
Source: The Fed Z1 & G19, BLS CPI 
 
Figure 10 depicts the aggregate and inflation adjusted mortgage liabilities for US households. In 
contrasting figures 9 and 10, the rapid rise in inflation adjusted money volume liabilities for 
households is, in part, due to increasing aggregate mortgage liabilities. Figures 9 and 10 exhibit a 
similar shape in their respective graphs – steady increases in liabilities in the period 1950 to 1979, 
with a rapid increase in liabilities from 1980 to 2007. 
 
The other major component of households’ debt is consumer credit, consisting of non-revolving 
and revolving credit. Figures 11 and 12 depict both aggregate inflation adjusted household 
consumer credit, with figure 12 breaking down aggregate consumer credit into its two major 
components of non-revolving and revolving liabilities. When comparing figures 11 and 12 the 
data illustrates that households’ liabilities, across the two major credit types escalates from 
around the mid 1980s onwards. However aggregated non-revolving credit has a more volatile 
growth rate, but on the whole non-revolving consumer credit has increased in the period from 
1980 onwards. Revolving credit on the other hand has had a rapid increase from the 1980s 
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onwards, having moderate growth since first being reported in the FFA from 1968. 
Figure 11: Aggregate Household consumer credit liabilities in $US, inflation adjusted (100=82-84) 
 
Source: The Fed Z1 & G19, BLS CPI 
 
Figure 12: Aggregate Household non-revolving and revolving credit liabilities in $US, inflation 
adjusted (100=82-84) 
 
Source: The Fed Z1 & G19, BLS CPI 
 
Comparing figures 9, 10 and 12 illustrates that the rise in household credit from around the 
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1980s onwards is largely due to rapid growth of mortgage and credit card liabilities. Given that 
mortgages and consumer credit are used for different purposes, for households increasing their 
liabilities across these two types of credit at a similar time suggests that there are changes and 
innovations in financial markets, in particular in the offering of credit, adopted by financial 
institutions. The next section, in analyzing aggregate household credit trends will examine this 
issue further. 
 
3.3 Aggregate Household Credit Trends 
3.3.1 Introduction 
In examining the US Flow of Funds Accounts (FFA) from 1950 to 2007, three main trends arise 
out of the analysis of aggregate households’ credit. The three main trends examined in this 
chapter are: the rise of revolving credit, the rise of securitized credit regardless of type of 
household credit, and increasing total household mortgages. 
 
It needs to be mentioned, that in examining the FFA data as it pertains to households, NPISH 
are also included in that data. However in order to ensure that, in this case, aggregated 
households remain the site of analysis, in the breakdown of the data, data that is specifically and 
largely NPISH will not be incorporated in the analysis. 
 
3.3.2 Rise of revolving credit 
In terms of the Federal Flow of Funds Accounts (FFA), the first year revolving credit was 
reported occurred in 1968. The aggregate household liabilities in 1968 are largely made up of 
mortgages and non-revolving consumer credit, approximately 87% of total liabilities. Revolving 
consumer credit makes up less than 0.5% of household credit in the same year. 
 
Figure 13: Institutions offering revolving credit and the year first recorded as offering revolving 
credit 
Institution Year revolving credit listed on Z1 table 
Commercial banks 1968 
Finance companies 1984 
Nonfinancial businesses 1970 
Credit unions 1984 
Savings institutions 1981 
Securitized consumer revolving credit 1989 
Source: The Fed Table Z1, L100 
 
Figure 13 does not suggest that revolving credit, broadly defined, was not in existence prior to 
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1968. The types of lines of credit that could be considered revolving that existed prior to 1968 
took the form retail credit, usually paid in installments to department stores (Calder, 1999, p. 
281). The difference is in which institutions are offering the credit – in this case, there is the rise 
of financial institutions offering revolving lines of credit that are not specifically used to purchase 
a good and/or service. Further, non-financial businesses also extend this type of revolving credit 
in 1970, moving away from installment plans initially offered prior. 
 
Figure 14: Proportion of household revolving credit in relation to total household liabilities 1968-
2007 (quarterly figures) 
 
Source: The Fed Table Z1, G19 
 
The introduction of revolving credit by commercial banks in 1968, and the expansion of 
revolving lines offered by financial institutions and non-financial corporations12 are the catalyst 
for this rise in revolving credit. 
 
In 1968, for every dollar of revolving credit there is $75 of non-revolving credit. By 2007, 
revolving consumer credit is 37% of the total non-mortgage credit lent to households. Further, 
for every dollar of revolving credit, there is $1.7 dollars in non-revolving credit. Clearly, in 
particular looking at figure 14, the use of revolving credit to fund everyday household 
expenditure has increased. 
 
The use of revolving credit is not an unknown phenomena in the US, with department stores 
being the initial sites through which households have access to revolving credit (Calder 1999, 
                                                            
12 The type of revolving credit offered in 1970 by non financial corporations becomes similar to that of a credit card, 
rather than instalment payments for the purchase of goods or services. 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
19
68
Q
1
19
69
Q
2
19
70
Q
3
19
71
Q
4
19
73
Q
1
19
74
Q
2
19
75
Q
3
19
76
Q
4
19
78
Q
1
19
79
Q
2
19
80
Q
3
19
81
Q
4
19
83
Q
1
19
84
Q
2
19
85
Q
3
19
86
Q
4
19
88
Q
1
19
89
Q
2
19
90
Q
3
19
91
Q
4
19
93
Q
1
19
94
Q
2
19
95
Q
3
19
96
Q
4
19
98
Q
1
19
99
Q
2
20
00
Q
3
20
01
Q
4
20
03
Q
1
20
04
Q
2
20
05
Q
3
20
06
Q
4
Page 41 of 79 
 
281). The change in revolving credit from being a small component of aggregate household debt 
to one where it makes up over one third of total consumer credit is large. Especially given that 
the interest rates on revolving lines of credit are greater than the Fed’s banks effective rate, and 
that for mortgages or non-revolving consumer credit. Figure 15 depicts the interest rates for the 
Fed’s banks funds effective rate (reported monthly) and credit cards (reported quarterly). As can 
be seen, with the exception of a small period from the late 1970s to early 1980s, credit card 
interest rates range from 1.5 to 3.5 times the Fed’s funds effective rate, with this divergence 
more pronounced from the late 1980s onwards.  
 
Figure 15: Federal funds effective interest rate (reported monthly) and credit card interest rates 
(reported quarterly), 1972-2007 
 
Source: The Fed H15 & G19 
 
3.3.3 Rise of securitization 
Securitization is the ‘practise of parceling and selling loans and other debt claims to other 
financial institutions, who then hold those purchased claims and then issue liabilities backed by 
such claims’ (Shin, 2010, p. 99). Securitization exists for households’ consumer and mortgage 
credit, with this financial innovation first occurring in relation to household credit in 1965 for 
mortgages, and in 1989 for both non-revolving and revolving credit. The securitized system of 
financial intermediation creates increasingly complex financial relationships that become more 
dependent on the conditions of capital markets (Shin, 2010, p. 102). In this way, US households 
become linked to and can be affected by the conditions of the capital markets through the 
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process of securitization. 
 
Looking specifically at mortgages, the securitization of mortgages, initially, was minor and was 
developed as a way to increase the availability of funds for mortgage lending to financial 
institutions, and to make mortgages affordable to households, in particular to minority groups 
and low socio-economic households (Fannie Mae, -; Freddie Mac, -). This innovation in 
mortgage lending, starting in 1965, was initially conducted within the realm of the Federal 
Government owned corporate agency, Ginnie Mae, with its focus on increasing international 
capital flows into the US housing market (Ginnie Mae, -), and the Government sponsored 
enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, focusing on domestic secondary mortgage 
markets (Fannie Mae, -; Freddie Mac, -). Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac act as a mortgage pool, in 
that they buy mortgages that meet specific criteria from lenders, hold the mortgage assets and 
issue liabilities, mortgage backed securities (MBS), against those assets (Fannie Mae, -; 
Freddiemac, -, Shin, 2010, p. 102). Ginnie Mae, with its focus on international capital, secured 
the mortgage pool bought buy international investors, ensuring that payments were made 
regardless of whether the underlying mortgage/s had defaulted (Ginnie Mae, -). A discussion of 
Ginnie Mae and GSEs are taken up in chapter 4, under the section ‘Government Policy’. In 1965 
Agency and GSE mortgage pools comprised less than 0.1% of total household mortgage assets. 
Private sector issuing of asset backed securities (ABS)13, was first reported as occurring in 1984. 
ABS mortgage issues comprised less than 1% of total mortgage assets in 1984. By the mid to late 
1990s, ABS and Agency and GSEs backed mortgage pools make up over half of the total 
household mortgage assets, with Agency and GSE backed mortgage pools comprising more than 
half of the total securitized household mortgage assets. It would seem that there is a correlation 
between securitization and an increase the amount of loanable funds available for mortgages. 
  
                                                            
13 In this context, ABS are pooled and tranched MBS that are converted into another layer of claims such as 
collateralized debt obligations (Shin 2010, 102). 
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Figure 16: US household total mortgage assets & its composition of Agency/GSEs and ABS, 
millions of $US, inflation adjusted (100=82-84) 
 
Source: The Fed, Table Z1, G19, G18; BLS CPI 
 
In relation to households’ consumer credit, the use of securitization for both non-revolving and 
revolving credit starts in 1989 according to the FFA. With revolving credit data accounted for in 
the FFA from 1968 onwards, the dates used to analyze non-revolving and revolving credit start 
from this year. Figure 17 depicts the total consumer credit, inflation adjusted, and starting at 
1989, the amount of that total consumer credit that is securitized. The amount of securitization, 
as a proportion of total consumer credit is not as large as that for mortgages. The securitization 
of consumer credit increases rapidly, then stabilizes in the early 2000s. Similar to that of 
household mortgages, securitization seems to be correlated with an increase in loanable funds 
available. 
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Figure 17: Total in aggregate, total non-revolving, total revolving, and securitized, Household 
Consumer Credit 1968-2007, $US millions, inflation adjusted (100=82-84) 
 
Source: The Fed FFA Table Z1, G19; BLS CPI 
 
Figure 18 depicts the non-revolving and revolving securitized components of total securitized 
consumer credit. Whilst initially non-revolving consumer credit was slightly greater than 
revolving consumer credit, during the period 1989 to 2007 there is overall a growing divergence 
between the two, with revolving consumer credit approximately more than double non-revolving 
consumer credit. 
  
0
200000
400000
600000
800000
1000000
1200000
1400000
19
68
‐01
19
69
‐10
19
71
‐07
19
73
‐04
19
75
‐01
19
76
‐10
19
78
‐07
19
80
‐04
19
82
‐01
19
83
‐10
19
85
‐07
19
87
‐04
19
89
‐01
19
90
‐10
19
92
‐07
19
94
‐04
19
96
‐01
19
97
‐10
19
99
‐07
20
01
‐04
20
03
‐01
20
04
‐10
20
06
‐07
Total Consumer 
Credit 
Total 
Nonrevolving 
Consumer 
Credit
Total Revolving 
Consumer 
Credit
Securitized 
Total Consumer 
Loans
Page 45 of 79 
 
Figure 18: Securitized non-revolving and revolving consumer credit, $US millions, inflation 
adjusted (100=82-84) 
 
Source: The Fed FFA Z1, G19; BLS CPI 
 
As noted earlier in section 3.2.1, the interest rate on credit cards is quite high compared to the 
Fed’s banks effective interest rate, with the credit card interest rate dropping around the late 
1980s. Figure 19 illustrates that there is a correlation between securitization of revolving credit 
and credit card interest rates, in particular that with increasing securitization of revolving credit, 
credit card interest rates have decreased. 
 
Figure 19: securitized revolving credit as a proportion of total revolving credit and credit card 
interest rates, 1989-2007 
 
Source: The Fed FFA Z1, G19 
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3.3.4 Increasing total household mortgage debt 
This rapid rise in inflation adjusted money volume liabilities for households is, in part, due 
the increase, in aggregate, of household mortgages. As depicted in figure 16, household’s 
mortgage debt has generally increased in the period 1950 to 2007, with three distinct 
periods of growth. From 1950 to early late 1970s there was steady rising growth in 
households’ mortgage debt. The period from the early 1980s to mid 1990s had increased 
growth, that was more rapid that the preceding period. The greatest growth in household 
mortgage debt was experienced from the mid 1990s onwards to 2007, where the growth 
was greater than both preceding periods. In order to examine the reasons behind rising 
aggregate mortgage debt, this section will analyze average house prices, home ownership 
rates, and the emergence of home equity lines of credit. 
 
Figure 20 depicts average US house prices from 1970 to 2007, inflation adjusted. The 
earliest house price data publicly available started from 1970 to the present. Figure 20 
illustrates that the average price of housing, whilst also fluctuating, had a steep increase in 
average price, inflation adjusted from the mid 1990’s onwards. Comparing figure 20 to 
figure 16, which depicts aggregated inflation adjusted households’ mortgage liabilities, a 
relationship between total households’ mortgage debt and average house prices, can be 
discerned. Utilizing the three distinct periods of increasing mortgage debt described above, 
in the earliest period, 1950 to late 1970s, house prices appear relatively stable with some 
fluctuation. In the second period, early 1980s to mid 1990s, where mortgage debt grew 
faster than the preceding period, average house prices exhibit similar fluctuations in 
average price to the previous period, however the amplitude of the fluctuations increase. 
The rapid increase in mortgage debt that occurs from the early 1980s, can partially be seen 
in figure 20, as average house prices increased. From the mid 1990s onwards, average 
house prices increase markedly, correlated to the rapid and steep growth in total household 
mortgage debt. Rather than housing prices being the sole correlate in relation to increasing 
mortgage debt, this analysis suggests that there are other issues at play for the rising 
mortgage liabilities than the price of houses. However it does seem likely that the increase 
in aggregate of mortgage debt from the early to mid 1980s and the mid 1990s onwards is 
in part related to the increase in the price of housing. 
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Figure 20: Average US house prices 1970 to 2007 in $US, inflation adjusted (100 = 82-84) 
 
Source: Bureau of Census table 11B, BLS CPI 
 
In examining home ownership rates of US households, figure 21 shows the level of home 
ownership. Home ownership in the US increases from 1965 to around the late 1970s, and has 
rapid growth from the mid 1990s onwards. There is a period of stable growth from the mid 
1980s to early 1990’s; with two periods of decline from early 1980s to mid 1980s, and mid 2000s. 
The rapid growth period from the mid 1990s, depicted in figure 21, correlates with increase in 
average house prices (inflation adjusted) from around the mid 1990s. This suggests that the 
growth in mortgage credit in the period of the mid 1990s onwards is in part due to the high 
demand for housing, which had the effect of pushing up average house prices. 
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Figure 21: US home ownership rates, 1965-2007 
 
Source: US Bureau of the Census, Series H-111 Reports 
 
The last aspect of increasing total household mortgage debt is the rise of home equity loans 
(HEL). HEL is a sub-category of household mortgage credit where a loan is taken out against 
the equity of a home (Cagnin, 2009, p. 155). The equity in the home is used as collateral to create 
a lien against the actual house, and reduces the actual home equity of the existing mortgage 
(Cagnin, 2009, p. 155). In the analysis above, HEL was incorporated in the total mortgage data. 
HEL are first reported in the FFA in 1970, and offered solely by finance companies. Initially 
HEL comprised less than 1% of total mortgage debt, as per figure 22. In 1990 there is a rapid 
increase in the composition of HEL as a proportion of total mortgage debt, moving from just 
under 1% in the previous year to close to 9% of total mortgage debt in 1990. The main reason 
for the increase in the proportion of HEL is the increase in the number of financial institutions 
offering this sub-category of mortgage debt, and the securitization of HEL debt. In this way the 
offering of HEL by financial institutions in 1990 contributes to the rapid increase in total 
mortgage debt from the mid 1990s onwards. 
  
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
19
65
19
67
19
69
19
71
19
73
19
75
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
Page 49 of 79 
 
Figure 22: HEL as a proportion of total mortgage credit 
 
Source: The Fed FFA, Table Z1 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
There is a difference in the household consumption of credit pre and post 1980, in particular the 
post 1980s environment is one where the consumption of debt by households increased 
markedly. The three main reasons for this increased consumption of credit are the rising use of 
revolving debt/credit cards, the increasing availability of credit for financial institutions to loan 
to households through the securitization of all types of credit, and expanding mortgage debt. The 
trends described in this chapter depict, in part, the changes that occurred prior to 1980 that lead 
to understanding the post 1980s US as a financialized accumulation regime, in illustrating the 
changes in the type of credit consumed by household, and the change in the types of financial 
instruments used in that consumption of credit.  
 
The trends discussed suggest that the geography of money availability, credit and financial 
instruments and investment has changed, in particular through the process of securitization. The 
Federal Government implicitly promoted the securitization of household credit, through its 
initial and continued support in chartering Ginnie Mae and GSEs specifically to transact 
securitized mortgage products. Securitization, from the analysis undertaken above, seems to be 
correlated with increases in the amount of loanable funds available, regardless of the types of 
credit. However this financial process links US households, and in particular households with 
mortgages and revolving lines of credit, closer to domestic and international capital flows, given 
that the instruments used in securitization are traded in the financial capital markets.  
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Chapter 4: US households from 1950 to 2007: comparisons between pre and 
post 1980 
 
The history of the financing of American dreams unfolded as part and parcel of a larger development 
in American history, a transformation of American culture that consumer credit had no small role 
in assisting (Calder, 1999, p. 6). 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter starts from the four propositions discussed in chapter 1, those being: the economy 
as socially defined whether in whole or part; the capitalist economy is better understood as an 
historical, temporal, and/or dynamic process; the role of political and economic institutions in 
impacting on the economy, in particular the household; and, expectations can have an 
unavoidable and significant effect and affect on economic outcomes. Thus the first aspect of 
analyzing US households and their consumption of credit is to understand the broader social and 
economic changes that have occurred over the time period 1950-2007, with a focus on the 
differences before and after 1980, recognizing that this is not a rigid date that suggests changes 
only happened from this point onwards. This examination will provide an overview of what has 
affected US households, and households’ responses to these changes. In particular this chapter 
will explore the changes within US households that occur from the 1980 onwards; the 
approximate time that was identified as showing a finance pattern of accumulation within the US 
economy.  
 
In this chapter, sections 4.1 and 4.2, uses data that breaks down household data by quintiles, as 
determined by before tax income, to illustrate the differential impacts of a finance pattern of 
accumulation, and households’ differential responses to that change. The determination to break 
down data into household quintiles stems from the data sets of the US Federal Government 
permitting disaggregation to the quintile level for before tax income, for the most part. Net 
household worth will also be used, where it was difficult to breakdown datasets into income 
before tax quintiles. Further, the disaggregating household data into quintiles, as will mostly be 
used by this thesis, also accords with the class analyses undertaken by Beeghley (2004), Gilbert 
(2002), and Thompson and Hickey (2005). The class structure is broadly depicted within five 
bands: lower classes/working poor, working classes, lower middle classes/middle classes, upper 
middle classes/ the rich, and the capitalist class/upper class/super rich (Beeghley, 2004; Gilbert, 
2002; Thompson & Hickey, 2005). This thesis recognizes that the class structure described will 
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not enable an analysis of US households that could be described as the underclass. For the 
purposes of this thesis, it is a reasonable assumption to make that the capacity of the underclass 
to borrow money from formal financial institutions is negligible as there is, limited or no 
participation in the labor market, and as a class it is broadly reliant on government transfers 
where households meet the criteria. The five class structure described enables a nuanced analysis 
without resorting to broadly categorizing households as an homogenous whole. 
 
The framework used for understanding the social and economic changes in US households arise 
from the brief economic analysis that took place in Chapter 2, and are: wages and salary, and the 
changing structure of the labor market; households’ incomes; and, government policy. 
 
4.2 Wages and salary, and the changing structure of the US labor market 
Returning to figure 8, this diagram illustrates that the majority of income received by US 
households, in aggregate, is in the form of salary and wages from employment, and that this 
form of household income is decreasing in proportion to other forms of income, especially from 
1980 onwards. However, figure 8 does not represent the number of households which 
predominantly rely on being employed by others, and the resultant drawing of a wage/ salary 
that is the biggest component of household income. 
 
Figure 23 depicts the broad occupation of the main reference person, from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS) Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES), undertaking the survey on behalf of the 
household; the occupations are broken into, self-employed, employed by other/s, retired, and 
not reporting/unemployed/other. This data is given as a percentage of households so as to be 
able to provide comparison over time. The data provided by the BLS starts in 1984; hence 1984 
is the earliest reference point that information can be found, and is within the timeframe that this 
chapter’s analysis takes place. Further the importance of salary and wages for the majority of 
households and the resultant income pre-1980 already exists (Brenner, 2003, p. 10; Reich, 2008, 
pp. 75-86). When analyzed in conjunction with figure 8, these two datasets illustrate the 
importance of waged/salaried employment within the aggregated US household, and that the 
majority of households rely on wages and salary from paid employment. Thus changes in the 
structure of the US labor market are likely to impact upon most households. It is the issues of 
the importance of wages/salary, and the industrial compositional change in employment that this 
section will take up. 
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Figure 23: Occupation by Reference person, % of total 
 
Source: BLS Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) 
 
Breaking down the sources of income by household quintile would give an illustration of how 
different households depend on salary and wages, especially from those that are employed by 
others, as a source of income thus are reliant on the conditions of the labor market. 
 
The disaggregating of household data to see the differential in reliance on wage/salary income 
was difficult, and there is a limited range of years to determine the effect. The Fed has a 
triennium data series that surveys households about finance, the Survey of Consumer Finance 
(SCF). However access to the full range of data from the Fed SCF is difficult, as not all years are 
available electronically, located in several databanks, has different levels of access, and the ability 
to breakdown data difficult as not all datasets interconnect to provide the precise data this thesis 
was seeking. The SCF datasets that were easiest to obtain and manipulate are the ones from 1989 
onwards. 
 
In order to provide some disaggregation, figure 24 depicts the breakdown between percentile 
households’ net worth14 and their before tax income that was constituted as wages/salary. There 
                                                            
14 Net worth is measured by total assets minus total liabilities – this measurement can include households that have 
negative net worth. 
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is a strong correlation between households’ net worth and household quintile based on income 
before tax.  
 
Figure 24: Wages as a % of before tax income by households’ percentile of net worth 
 
Source: The Fed SCF 
 
Figure 24 demonstrates that the bulk of households rely on salary and waged income, ie that 
arises from work performed as an employee, to provide a living. The bottom three percentiles of 
household net worth are grouped around 73-87% as to the proportion of wages that their 
respective household income before tax is derived. Further these three bottom percentiles are 
becoming convergent, demonstrating the increasing importance of salary and wages from being 
employed by others for the three bottom net worth households. The fourth percentile of 
household net worth as a percentage of before tax income is between a bands of 63-72%, with 
the percentage wage/salary broadly stable over the period, hovering around 72%. Lastly the top 
percentile has, on trend, less than a 50% proportion of wage/salary income of total before tax 
household income. Therefore the household differentials of before tax household income 
illustrate the different reliance that different households have on securing employment through 
the labor market; with the 80% of households reliant on wages/salary for more than 50% of 
their household income. 
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As established above, the majority of American households rely on wages from employment as 
the major source of income.  
 
The unemployment rate measures the number of unemployed persons as a percent of the total 
labor force. A person is considered unemployed if they are aged 16 years and older who have not 
been employed during the reference week when the data is being compiled, were available work, 
and made specific efforts to find employment in the three weeks prior to the reference week. It 
should also be noted that the measure unemployment rate used in this section has its own 
limitation, as it does not report on underemployment, and individuals who are no longer looking 
for employment despite being unemployed.  
 
Figure 25: % Unemployment in the US 1950-2007 
 
Source: BLS ‘Unemployment Rate’ 
 
Figure 25 shows the BLS reported annual unemployment rate for the US from 1950-2007. 
Looking at figure 11, unemployment was lowest in 1953 at 2.9%, and highest in 1982 at 9.7%. 
The annualized rate of unemployment was generally lower, and more stable, in the period 
preceding 1975. Higher rates of unemployment are experienced from 1975 onwards, with the 
lowest percentage of unemployed in the period 1975-2009, reported in 2000 at 4%. The rate of 
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unemployment has identifiable peaks and troughs, following an inverse pattern to real GDP 
growth as depicted in figure 2; that is when real GDP growth increases, the annualized 
unemployment rate decreases. There is more volatility and longer periods of above 6% in the 
unemployment rate from 1975 onwards. Comparing pre and post 1975 unemployment patterns, 
there are three issues that flow from the graphical illustration and analysis, (1) percentage of 
unemployment post-1975 has not matched the lows experienced in the preceding time period of 
1950 to 1975, (2) the unemployment rate from 1975-2009 has been higher, and for longer 
periods of time, than the 1950-1975 period, and (3) the unemployment rate is more volatile, and 
higher in the later thirty-two years than the preceding twenty-five years. Thus unemployment, 
given its more volatile and extended periods of high rates, has become an issue for households, 
especially those in the bottom percentiles of net worth, post 1975. 
 
As previously discussed, figure 6 illustrates the changing industry employment structure of the 
US economy. Broad changes in relation to the labor market included the increasing share of 
employment based in the AERAC, EHSA, PB and RT industries. In order to understand how 
the changes in industrial make-up of the labor force affect US households, this thesis will look at 
annual average weekly wage rates. The data available to compare annual average weekly wage 
rates from the BLS starts in 1965, and is broken down into super-sectors, comprising: 
construction, education and health services, financial activities, information, leisure and 
hospitality, manufacturing, natural resources and mining, other services, professional and 
business services, and trade, transportation and utilities. The super-sectors that contain the 
industries that have an increasing share of employment in the US economy and pictured in figure 
6 are: education and health services, leisure and hospitality, professional and business services, 
and trade, transportation and utilities. Whilst the data being used is not homologous as figure 6 is 
based on industry groupings and figure 26 based on sectoral groupings, the wages data from the 
BLS will provide a broad snapshot of wages trends in those industries that have been increasing 
their proportion of employment in the US economy. 
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Figure 26: Selected super-sectors’ average weekly earnings for production and nonsupervisory 
employees on private nonfarm payrolls, in constant 1982-1984 dollars, 1965-2007 
 
Source: BLS, table B2; BLS CPI (1982-1984 = 100) 
 
Figure 26 illustrates a number of important salary and wage issues that the changing structure of 
the labor market will have on the households that rely on wages/salary as its primary source of 
household income. With the exception of financial activities, professional and business services 
and education and health services, the remaining super-sectors’ average weekly wage has been 
largely stagnant or decreasing post 1980. In the case of the professional and business services 
sector, the average weekly wage has not returned to its previous high level in 1965; and it has 
been in the last decade that there have been wage increases in this super-sector. Education and 
health services super-sector have also experienced increased average weekly wages, with the 
wages slowly rising from around 1980 onwards; average weekly wages are higher than the two 
super-sectors with the lowest average weekly wages, leisure and hospitality, and trade, 
transportation and utilities. The financial activities super-sector has had the greatest wage growth, 
with 2007 as the year for the highest average weekly earnings. 
 
Extrapolating the information contained in figures 6 and 26, clearly the changes in the industrial 
composition of the US labor market coupled and the attendant average wages depicted, US 
households that primarily rely on wages/salary as the main source of household income have 
affected these households. Coupled with the unemployment data in figure 25, it is also possible 
that the average weekly figures discussed above may not translate into similar household income, 
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as with an increasing volatility of the unemployment rate households could experience periods of 
no salary and wages. The possibility of the bottom four percentiles of households, as measured 
by net worth above, losing their major source of income and/or having highly variable income is 
a very real issue as this directly impacts on the ability of households to maintain its standard of 
living, and declining income from wages and salary could, as seen in figure 8 albeit in aggregate, 
could provide a reason for increasing household debt from the early 1980s onward (Bivens & 
Weller, 2010; Warren, The New Economics of the Middle Class: why making ends meet has 
gotten harder, 2007). 
 
These changes in the labor market are in part also explained by political factors; in particular the 
restructuring of the US economy that took place post 1975, when there was an outbreak of high 
inflation and high unemployment. This issue of restructuring, and in particular the US 
Government and Federal Agencies response, will be addressed under Chapter 4’s sub-heading of 
‘Government Policy’. 
 
From this economic restructuring that took place from around 1975 onwards, households that 
largely rely on salaries and wages from being employed by others ie those largely in the bottom 
four income and wealth bands, felt the effects of the changes to labor market. These households 
also make up approximately 60 - 80% of total households. The changes broadly understood as 
labor market flexibility includes, less secure forms of employment, the repudiation of wages 
growing with productivity leading to decreasing wages and declining employment conditions, 
and destabilizing and decreasing the role of labor representation in the economy (Bellamy Foster 
& Magdoff, 2008; Palley, 2009, pp. 53-61). Further, from the 1980s onwards there is an increase 
in households, across all classes, with dual earners and/or earners holding two or more jobs 
(Warren, 2004, p. 405; Warren, 2007).  
 
This restructuring of the labor market from 1975 onwards reflects the change in economic 
ideology towards neo-liberalism, in particular the “substitution of borrowing and asset price 
inflation” and inflation targeting, in place of full employment (Palley, 2009, pp. 53-57). 
 
4.3 Households’ incomes  
In order to understand how these changes in the labor market have affected household income, 
the thesis will now analyze changes in household income, at the quintile level, in particular 
looking at the changes in household income real growth over different decades. It should be 
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noted here that the earliest data that could be sourced starts from 1967/8. As has been seen 
above, the changes in the labor market have had effects on households, given most households 
rely on salary and wages as their primary form of household income. 
 
Figure 27: Mean household income, by quintile 1967-2007, CPI adjusted (100 = 82-84) 
 
Source: US Census Bureau Table H3, BLS CPI 
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Figure 28: Real household income growth, by quintile from 1968 onwards 
 
Source: derived from data held by US Census Bureau, Table H3 
 
Figure 27 depicts the CPI adjusted mean household income received by quintile for the period 
1967 to 2007; 1967 was the earliest year data was available broken down by quintile. The data 
illustrates that for most households, income has stagnated or declined. As can be seen by figure 
28, in terms of real growth of household income, there has been real household income decline 
especially in the bottom 60% of households. Until the 1980s household income growth had been 
broadly even across all households regardless of income quintile. It is from the 1980s onward 
that household income growth for the top 20% of households is approximately double that of 
the bottom 60% of households.  
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Figure 29: Average rate of inflation from 1968 onwards 
 
Source: BLS Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
 
The bottom 60% of households have experienced real household income growth of less than 
1% in decades from 1980 onwards, with the rate of inflation three to five times greater than 
these households’ income growth rate. The average rate of inflation for the time period 
concerned is depicted in figure 29. Household incomes for the bottom 60% of households have 
not kept up with the rate of inflation, and suggest there is declining capacity to keep up with the 
costs of living. This is also the case with the top 40% of households, but not to the same extent. 
In the case of the top 20% of households the difference between the real household income 
growth rate and the rate of inflation, the difference is less and the difference ranges from 
approximately 0.66 to 2.5 times the growth of rate of the top income quintile households. This 
analysis highlights the differential impact that relying on wages/salary as the primary source of 
household income can have on changes to household income, especially where the labor market 
restructures to increase the employment in periphery and/or low paying industries. 
 
The discussion of the composition of household income, illustrates that the top households, as 
measured by net worth has a greater diversity of income sources, and has maintained growth in 
household income, compared to most households as determined by net worth, and are not as 
reliant on the labor market for the provisioning of household income. Figure 30 shows the 
components that make up the rest of the top households’ income. 
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Figure 30: Top quintile households, as determined by net-worth, household income, broken 
down into proportional components (excluding wage) 
 
Source: The Fed SCF 
 
As can be seen in figure 30, the next major component of the top quintile households’ income 
derives from interest, dividends and capital gains, making up approximately 20%, average, of 
these households’ income. With no other household type, as determined by net worth, following 
a similar pattern of household income sources, especially from interest, dividends and capital 
gains, this household stands apart and supports one of the categories utilized by Krippner’s 
(2005, pp. 174-174, 181-182) for understanding financialization, in particular that of the rise of a 
rentier class (Hilferding, 2006 [1910]). 
 
Linking the analysis from chapter 3 on aggregated households’ consumption of credit, with the 
previous sections exploration of the changes in the labor market and its impacts on salary and 
wages and households’ incomes, the increase in households’ liabilities occurs in a similar 
timeframe to when wages and salary incomes, on which the majority of households are reliant on 
that as a chief component of households’ incomes, are stagnating or declining. This suggests that 
within households, especially where salary and wages are the main source of household income, 
that increasing aggregate household debt correlates with being used as a way to make up for 
declining real wages. 
 
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007
Interest/ Dividends/ 
Capital Gains
Business/ Farm/ Self‐
Employment
Social Security/ 
Retirement
Transfers/ Other
Page 62 of 79 
 
4.4 Government policy 
This thesis understands that a change in the pattern of accumulation has occurred within US 
capitalism from around the 1980s onward, and formal social structures, in particular government 
departments, programs and actions, perform a role in providing stability, particularly social 
stability. In this way, a discussion about financialization, US households and their consumption 
of credit, would not be complete without a discussion on how the Federal Government is 
providing the necessary stability to support US households within the financialized pattern of 
accumulation that has taken place since 1980s onwards. 
 
As mentioned earlier the economic problems existing in the late 1970s, that of rising inflation, 
and increasing unemployment, resulted in changes to the social contract between capital and 
labor, that had previously existed in the post World War II period. In particular, aspects of the 
economic ideology of neo-liberalism were adopted by the US Federal Government (Panitch & 
Gindin, 2009; Warren, The New Economics of the Middle Class: why making ends meet has 
gotten harder, 2007). Neo-liberalism as it pertains to this thesis can be broadly identified as the 
rise of central banking and monetary policy in particular the primacy of price stability (Panitch & 
Gindin, 2009, pp. 30-37), and the “substitution of borrowing and asset price inflation”, in place 
of policies for full employment and social welfare that constituted the labor-capital social 
contract (Palley, 2009, pp. 53-57). This is not to say that there was a clear rupture from one 
economic ideology by the US Government pre and post 1980. Instead this thesis recognizes that 
capitalist economies are dynamic and that changes in economic policy are rooted in the 
historical, temporal and spatial arrangements existing at that moment. This section will not cover 
the full range of policies enacted by the US Federal Government and its arms, instead engaging 
with two particular aspects of US Government economic policy that crossover with the previous 
examination on US households. The changes in economic policy instituted by the Federal 
Government and its arms, in the late 1970s/early 1980s can be broadly recognized as – the 
adoption of price stability as the primary mechanism to achieve economic stability, and changes 
in government economic policy to reduce public sector spending. 
 
The period of high inflation and growing unemployment in the late 1970s to the 1980s resulted 
in a change of Government policy; which led to the eventual dominance of monetary policy, 
specifically the goal of price stability as the best way to achieve economic sustainability and 
stability (Bernanke, 2006; Eatwell & Taylor, 2001, pp. 114-116; McDonough, 1996; Panitch & 
Gindin, 2009). The Fed, as the central bank in the US and largely the site in which monetary 
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policy is enacted, is legally required to pursue three objectives to make policy decisions that: 
maximize participation in the labor market, provide for price stability, and moderate long-term 
interest rates (Bernanke, 2006; McDonough, 1996); with price stability recognized as the primary 
plank to the enactment of the other two objectives of the Fed (Bernanke, 2006; McDonough, 
1996). The argument for focusing on price stability is that: 
‘price stability both contributes importantly to the economy’s growth and 
employment prospects in the longer term and moderates variability of output and 
employment in the short to medium term… promotes efficiency and long-term 
growth by providing a monetary and financial environment in which economic 
decisions can be make and markets operate without concern about unpredictable 
fluctuations in the purchasing power of money’ (Bernanke, 2006). 
Under this regime of economic policy: capital continues to appreciate, and money (in assets and 
liabilities) do not lose value. In this way, focusing on price stability, according to this approach of 
economic policy, would ensure, by virtue of creating a non-inflationary economic environment, 
that monetary policies designed for full employment and ensuring a stable interest rate would 
result directly out of policies for price stability. 
 
As can be seen from previous analyses, the economic environment as it pertains to households, 
especially those reliant on salary and wages for the majority of income, that from around 1980 
onwards unemployment is more volatile and higher than the pre 1980s period. Further, those 
households that are reliant on salary and wages for income have stagnated and/or decreased. 
The majority of households are reliant on incomes largely provided by salary and wages and have 
seen their purchasing power diminish, as household income has not kept up with inflation (see 
figures 28 and 29). In relation to employment prospects, as per figure 25, unemployment has 
become more volatile since 1980, and has not returned to a low unemployment environment 
experienced in the post World War II boom. In this way, the approach taken by the US 
Government in adopting monetary policy and giving primacy to price stability over full 
employment, have affected negatively a majority of households, in particular those households 
reliant on employment and the salary and wages. Lastly given, in aggregate, US households have 
increased their consumption of credit, most households are reliant on salary and wages for 
households’ income, it stands to reason that ‘[s]ocieties whose members live on credit need 
growth and, most important of all, prospects of [secure] employment’ (Gelpi & Julien-Lubruyere, 
2000, p. 112) 
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As part of the Government’s change in economic ideology there was a focus on reducing the 
size of the state, and in particular direct welfare service provision by Government (Bellofiore & 
Halevi, 2009, p. 16; Guttmann & Plihon, 2010, pp. 270-271; Stockhammer, 2008, pp. 194-195). 
Whilst expenditures on the public service and the state have not decreased from the 1980s 
onwards, at the same time there has been a change in economic ideology from one of ‘limited, 
but substantial state intervention to one of radical laissez faire’ (Bellofiore & Halevi, 2009, p. 16; 
Guttmann & Plihon, 2010, pp. 270-271; Stockhammer, 2008, pp. 194-196; Stockhammer, 2009, 
p. 6). In this way, there has been a reduction of government provision of the social safety net 
without a necessary reduction in total Government spending (Bellofiore & Halevi, 2009, p. 16; 
Guttmann & Plihon, 2010, pp. 270-271; Stockhammer, 2008, pp. 194-196; Stockhammer, 2009, 
p. 6). This is despite the post 1980s environment being one where unemployment was more 
volatile and household income for most US households was stagnating or in decline. 
 
In particular as part of the Federal Government’s shift away from direct funding and provision 
of social welfare programs for households, home ownership was cemented as the primary plank 
of bipartisan welfare policy (Hackworth & Wyly, 2003). Housing was viewed as providing a store 
of wealth that could provide social and economic security for households (Allon, 2009, p. 372). 
With the advent of Federal Government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) given charters to expand 
the mortgage secondary market15 in order to increase the supply of money available for mortgage 
lending, the Government could support increasing home ownership, a social program, without 
having to inject major expenditure to achieve this policy (Hackworth & Wyly, 2003). It is from 
this bipartisan support and the cementing of home ownership as welfare, a form of ‘asset based 
welfare’ and financialized welfare, that secondary markets and securities were evidenced to work, 
have implied Government assistance and backing, and were eventually extended to other forms 
of credit offered by largely private financial institutions. (Allon, 2009, pp. 372-373; Newman, 
2008, pp. 750-752; Wray, 2009, pp. 57-60; Wyly & Crump, 2008; Wyly, Hammel, & Atia, 2004 
(March), pp. 3-6).  
 
The cementing of home ownership as bipartisan welfare policy by the Federal Government 
involved financial innovation. In the 1960s and 1970s the Federal Government legislated for 
depositary institutions to provide fair housing finance and equal provision of credit such that 
                                                            
15 A secondary market can be understood as: a market where investors purchase from other investors; and, in the 
case of GSEs, a market in which they purchase mortgages from issuing lenders. Broadly speaking, a secondary 
market is a place of trade where the proceeds go to an investor, and not the company or entity directly (in the case 
of the mortgages to the mortgagee). 
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households who qualified for mortgages could buy a home (Fannie Mae, -; Freddie Mac, -). 
Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac purchased mortgage loans from lending issuers from the 
secondary market, and sold securities based on these mortgages, mortgage backed securities 
(MBS) in secondary markets (Fannie Mae, -; Freddie Mac, -). Ginnie Mae, a government owned 
corporation, is chartered to channel global capital into US housing finance markets by 
guaranteeing the timely payment of MBS held by international investors (Ginnie Mae, -). The 
financial innovation of mortgage pools backed by the Government and GSEs, according to the 
FFA, was first recorded as occurring in 1965. With private financial institutions creating asset 
backed securities (ABS) based on mortgage pools from 1984 onwards, according to the FFA. As 
can be seen by figure 22, the level of home ownership has not fallen below the 1965 rate. Whilst 
there have been fluctuations in the rate of home ownership, on the whole the trend is towards a 
growing rate of home ownership from the period 1965 to 2007. 
 
In a way households’ consumption of credit is, also in part, includes the process of how the US 
Federal Government is supporting US households rising debt through the process of 
financialization – Epstein’s (2005:3) financial motive is evident. By providing and increasing 
underserved households access to mortgages, and increasing the availability of loanable funds 
more generally, the Federal Government elicited a change, whether implicit or explicit, in how 
households access financial institutions through financial innovation, in particular the reliance on 
home ownership as a key plank of social policy (Allon, 2009, pp. 372-373). The implication of 
households providing a major source of their own consumption, wealth and welfare through 
home ownership means that expectations are such that households will individually determine 
how credit is consumed. This determination takes place in an economic environment 
households’ income is stagnating or declining as wages and salary from employment are 
stagnating or declining.  
 
The provision of accessibly mortgage credit to households that are low socio-economic status 
and/or belong to a minority group is the means through which the government is, in part, 
providing social services, social safety net, and welfare (Hackworth & Wyly, 2003; Wyly, 
Hammel, & Atia, 2004 (March)). The part provision of welfare in this way appears to be 
supported by the change in economic ideology, to that of neo-liberalism, adopted by Federal 
Government in the late 1970s/early 1980s. Through the making of mortgage credit more 
accessible to underserved households, according to this neoliberal ideology, the Government has 
provided the means through which households are able to improve their life, through the store 
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of wealth in home ownership. Because the taking on of mortgage credit is individualized at the 
household level, this also means that the aspects of class, gender, race or ethnicity is ignored 
(Wyly, Hammel, & Atia, 2004 (March)), as the Federal Government has provided access across 
the board to all households that are eligible. Access to home mortgages as welfare, provided 
through financial means, individualizes responsibility for the situation households may find 
themselves in, regardless of the broader economic situation. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
Through the above discussion and analysis the broad idea of financialization espoused by 
Epstein (2005:3) is evidenced as occurring within the realm of the post 1980s US household. 
With financialization, in part understood as, the increasing role of financial motives, financial 
markets, financial actors and financial institutions, broadly comprehended, in the operation of 
the economy (Epstein, 2005, p. 3) can be seen to have impacted upon US households. With 
households, in aggregate, increasing their consumption of credit, households themselves can also 
be considered financial actors, due to their liabilities. The changes in the labor market and the 
attendant impact on wages and salary, and household changes in its consumption of credit 
illustrate that most US households have increasingly utilized financial motives to, in part, 
compensate for stagnating and/or declining income. There is a correlation between declining 
and stagnating household income for the majority of households and an increase in households’ 
overall consumption of credit. This correlation can be understood as the use of credit to make 
up the shortfall in households’ declining and/or stagnating real wages. The role of Federal 
Government social policy, in particular its focus on increasing home ownership levels of US 
households among minority groups and low socioeconomic status, has also played a role in 
increasing the link between US households and financial markets, and financial institutions. In 
this way financialization cannot be viewed as a singular process, and instead needs to be 
understood as multi-faceted, and involving multiple points of intersection and difference. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion – the financialization story of US households 
 
Their [less qualified workers’ households] level of living is declining, and they [less qualified workers’ 
households] are only too painfully aware of the fact because they [less qualified workers’ households] 
are accustomed to bourgeois pretensions. Furthermore, as the giant [finance capital] concerns expand, 
it is largely these badly paid positions which increase in number, while there is no correspondingly 
increase in the higher posts (Hilferding, 2006 [1910], p. 348). 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Returning to Epstein’s (2005, p. 3) definition, and having provided the broad trends affecting US 
households and their consumption of credit, the thesis now turns to how the previous chapters 
depict financialization in the US households, and making sense of how the consumption of 
credit by households can be understood through the lens of financialization. Krippner’s (2005, 
pp. 174-175, 181-182) categorization of how financialization is manifest in the US economy can 
be adapted such that the multi-dimensional framework is able to be adapted to incorporate the 
impacts on US households. There are five categories to Krippner’s (2005, pp. 174-175, 181-182) 
framework, entailing: increased shareholder value as corporate governance; the rise of capital 
market financial systems over bank-based mechanisms; the ascent of a rentier class; the increased 
volume of financial trading and instruments; and, increasing profit share through financial 
channels as opposed to trade and production. The focus of this framework is on the economy 
and non-financial firms, and does not explicitly incorporate households. In undertaking the 
previous analysis in the preceding chapters, qualitative and quantitative, applying this 
financialization framework to US households can be undertaken and a nuanced understanding of 
the relationships between financialization and US households can be ascertained. With 
financialization as a pattern of accumulation broadly identified as taking place from around 1980, 
this chapter will be focusing on the post 1980 patterns identified in the analysis undertaken 
above, as a financial pattern of accumulation is not discernable prior to 1980. 
 
The structure of this chapter follows the five components of the financialization framework 
proposed by Krippner (2005, pp. 174-175, 181-182), and how this can be applied to US 
households to provide an understanding for how a pattern of financial accumulation has 
impacted upon households, in particular in the way that credit is consumed. 
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5.2 Ascendancy of shareholder value as a mode corporate governance 
The main idea behind the ascendancy of shareholder value as a mode corporate governance is 
the increased and prominent importance given to the interests of investors, current and future, in 
the operation of non-financial firms, from the boardroom to the local workplace (Orhangazi, 
2008a, pp. 868-871). The evidence of the increasing importance of shareholder value as 
corporate governance has been the: increased financial payouts by non-financial firms, in 
particular that of interest and dividend payments and stock buybacks, focus of non-financial 
firms on increasing their share prices, and the generation of profits (regardless from which 
activity they are generated) (Orhangazi, 2008a, pp. 868-871). 
 
With investor interests viewed as paramount to the ongoing operation of non-financial firms, 
and increasing payments going to investors and to debt, all things being equal, there would be a 
decline in the capacity of non-financial firms to increase employment, the pay roll and/or 
provide for better salary and wages and conditions of employment. In this way there is a 
correlation to the ascendency of shareholder value as a mode of corporate governance, and the 
increased volatility of unemployment and declining and/or stagnating household income for the 
majority of households reliant on employment.  
 
The analogous characterization of Krippner’s (2005, pp. 174-175, 181-182) shareholder value as 
corporate governance category, such that it can apply explicitly to the majority of households, is 
that of increasingly volatile unemployment and the stagnation and/or decline of salary/wages 
provided by employment. 
5.3 The rise of capital market financial systems over bank-based mechanisms 
Returning to chapter 2 the discussion of the different types of financial intermediation 
specifically that of the difference between financial intermediation involving deposit-taking banks 
only, and the securitization system of financial intermediation is what is typified by bank-based 
mechanisms and capital market financial systems (Shin, 2010, pp. 98-99). The securitized system 
of financial intermediation creates increasingly complex financial relationships that become more 
dependent on the conditions of capital market conditions (Shin, 2010, p. 102). 
 
Specifically through analyzing the FFA undertaken in chapter 3 focusing on household credit, it 
is apparent that there is an increase in capital market financial systems over bank based 
mechanisms, and an increase in the types of financial instruments that are linked to household 
credit. From the analysis of chapter 3, the rise of securitization of household debts is an example 
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of this trend of capital market financial systems over bank-based mechanisms. Figures 16, 17 and 
18 illustrate that all aspects of households’ financial market based credit, mortgage and 
consumer, has been securitized, thereby creating complex financial relationships between 
households and other financial actors that are dependent on the conditions of capital markets. 
 
The Federal Government in chartering GSEs to engage in the secondary mortgage market to 
provide an increase in the available funds for mortgages started this trend towards the 
securitization of household credit. In relating this to US households and their consumption of 
credit, there is the increasing securitization of all categories of household debt. 
 
5.4 The ascent of a rentier class 
Krippner’s (2005, pp. 174-175, 181-182) depiction of the ascent of the rentier class is influenced 
by Hilferding. Hilferding (2006 [1910], 223-226), and Bukharin (1927, 15-34) theorize a structural 
change in capitalist economic development, that of the eventual transformation of industrial 
capital and finance capital into cartels which have interdependent relationships with each other 
(the rentier class), and the rise of a class of households whose main source of income is from 
financial means. It is this that is taken up in Krippner’s (2005, pp. 174-175, 181-182) framework 
for understanding the construct of financialization. 
 
Returning to chapter 4, specifically the top quintile, determined by net worthy, households’ 
breakdown of household income depicted in figure 30, there is evident that this quintile is not as 
reliant on salary and wages as the rest of the 80% of households. With no other household type, 
as determined by net worth, following a similar pattern of household income sources, especially 
from interest, dividends and capital gains, this household stands apart and supports a plank of 
Krippner’s (2005, pp. 174-175, 181-182) financialization schema that of the rise of a rentier class 
(Hilferding, 2006 [1910]). 
 
The top net worth quintile households, with access to a diversity of income sources not available 
to the majority of households in the remaining 80%, there is the development of a class of 
households that are able to secure household income through other means. Thus the ascent of a 
rentier class can be understood as the top quintile, as determined by net worth, households have 
ready access to alternate sources for the derivation of household income, and are not as reliant 
on the salary and wages of employment. 
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5.5 The increased volume of financial trading and instruments 
Whilst the issue of financial trading and financial instruments has not been directly addressed, 
the increase of the securitization of household debt increases the volume of financial trading and 
instruments. With the MBS and mortgage ABS, along with the securitization of consumer credit 
(both non-revolving and revolving) being constructed and sold on capital markets, there has 
been increase in financial trading and instruments that arise from households’ credit since the 
initial construction of MBS in 1965. 
 
The analysis undertaken in chapter 3, specifically section 3.3.3 highlights the rise of securitization 
of households’ credit. Specifically through analyzing the FFA, focusing on household credit, 
there is an increase in the types of financial instruments that are linked to household credit. 
There is a general acceptance that there has been an increased volume, overall, of financial 
trading and instruments in capital markets (Grahl & Lysandrou, 2006; Phillips, 1996). This 
increased volume of financial trading and instruments in capital markets of household debt 
means that US households with debt become dependent on the conditions of capital markets 
(Shin, 2010, p. 102). 
 
An analogous categorization of a pattern of financialized accumulation as it applies to 
households, is the linking and dependency of households on the conditions of capital markets 
resulting from the securitization of all categories of household debt. 
 
5.6 Increasing profit share through financial channels as opposed to trade and 
production 
Non-financial firms in the US are increasing their profit share through financial channels, as 
opposed to trade and production (Krippner, 2003; Krippner, 2005; Orhangazi, 2008a; 
Orhangazi, 2008b). The increasing of profit share through financial channels has had a negative 
impact non-financial firms investment in investment in non-financial arenas (Orhangazi, 2008b). 
 
The impact of non financial firms decisions on investing through financial channels, rather than 
non-financial avenues, on US households is correlated to increasingly volatile unemployment and 
stagnating and/or declining household income, where households are largely reliant on salary 
and wages for the compensation of their labor (see figures 25 and 26). Thus it is the 80% of 
households, the majority, that are affected by these non-financial firm decisions on investment. 
The increasing investment by non-financial firms in financial channels, along with the correlation 
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in volatile unemployment and stagnating and/or declining households’ income, is also correlated 
with households increasing consumption of credit. Suggesting that the increasing consumption 
of credit, is in part, understood as compensating for declining household income. 
 
Thus, in understanding how households fit in within the category of increasing investment by 
non-financial firms through financial channels (Krippner, 2005, pp. 174-175, 181-182) is the 
correlation of rising credit consumption by households as a way to compensate for declining 
and/or stagnating household income. 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
The analysis undertaken in relation to US households’ consumption of credit from 1950 to 2007, 
has shown that there was a change in the pattern of accumulation that has broadly taken place 
since 1980. In particular within the household, the change in the pattern of accumulation has led 
to a major growth in the consumption of credit, in aggregate, by households. At the same time 
there has been a reduction, in aggregate, of household saving. Linked with most households 
experiencing stagnating and declining households income has been increased volatility of the 
labor market. 
 
In terms of being able to characterize the US households, the utilizing the framework posited by 
Krippner (2005, pp. 174-175, 181-182) for understanding the multi-dimensional processes of 
financialization as a pattern of accumulation are: 
1. increasing volatility of unemployment, and the stagnation and/or decline of salary/wages 
provided by employment; 
2. increasing securitization of all categories of household debt; 
3. the top quintile, as determined by net worth, households having ready access to alternate 
sources for the derivation of household income, and are not as reliant on the salary and wages of 
employment; 
4. households being linked and dependent on the conditions of capital markets through the 
securitization of all forms of households’ credit; and, 
5. rising credit consumption by households as a way to compensate for declining and/or 
stagnating household income. 
 
From this analysis, it can also be identified that the Federal Government has also played a role in 
the financialization process, in introducing financial welfare specifically for providing the 
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capacity for financial institutions to provide access to the opportunity for eligible households to 
take out a mortgage, at a reduced cost to the lender.  
  
Thus in examining the consumption of credit by US households, particularly post s1980, it 
would seem that for the majority of US households, credit has become an economic necessity 
rather than desire driven consumption. 
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Data Sources 
Bureau of Census 
 Current Population Survey/Housing Vacancies and Homeownership - 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/historic/index.html  
 Income - http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/income.html  
Bureau of Economic Analysis 
 Annual Industry Accounts - http://www.bea.gov/industry/index.htm#annual  
 GDP - http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp  
 Personal Income and Outlays - http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#personal  
Bureau of Labor Statistics 
 Consumer Expenditure Survey - http://www.bls.gov/cex/  
 Consumer Price Index - http://www.bls.gov/data/#prices  
 Pay and Benefits - http://www.bls.gov/data/#wages  
 Unemployment Rate - http://www.bls.gov/data/#unemployment  
Federal Reserve 
 Consumer Credit – G19, 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/Choose.aspx?rel=G.19  
 Flow of Funds Accounts - 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/Choose.aspx?rel=Z.1  
 Selected Interest Rates – H15, 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/Choose.aspx?rel=H.15  
 Survey of Consumer Finances - 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss2/scfindex.html  
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